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Equality, Trust, and Tolerance∗ 
How Sense of Equality Affects 
Social Tolerance in Romania 
DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN 
 
 
 
 
Social trust is one of the most disputed topics discussed in recent years in so-
cial sciences. Its importance results from the functions many scholars suppose trust 
may support. Trust may be related to some very desirable values: inherent values 
(happiness, optimism for the future), but also political values (public support for 
working democratic institutions, minorities’ rights and social tolerance, higher po-
litical participation), and economic values (a positive relationship between per-
sonal income and economic growth at an aggregate level)1. Whereas trust may fa-
cilitate communication, it may make easier to attein common goals, and may be es-
sential in all collective action. Moreover, trust is also critical to democracy. It links 
ordinary citizens to the institutions that are intended to represent them, thereby 
enhancing both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government2. 
Fukuyama defines trust as ”the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the 
part of other members of that community. Those norms can be about deep value 
questions like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms 
like professional standards and codes of behavior”3. According to Mark Freitag, 
”Trust furthers norms, which abdicate egocentric calculations and self-in-
terest. Moreover, it strenghtens the willingness of individuals to act in the inter-
ests of the group or community to overcome social dilemmas […] it stimulates 
a type of generalized reciprocity were altruistic behavior and obligations will 
be repaid at some unspecified time, at some unspecified location, by an un-
specified person. Generalized attitudes of trust extend beyond the boundaries 
of face-to-face interaction and incorporate people who are not personally 
known. These attitudes go beyond the boundaries of kinship and friendship 
and the boundaries of acquaintance”4. 
                                                    
∗ I want to thank Adrian Moraru for the access to the data from the survey on ”Intolerance, 
Discrimination, and Authoritarianism in the Public Opinion” (Institute for Public Policy 
Romania). 
1 Bo ROTHSTEIN, Eric M. USLANER, ”All for All: Equality and Social Trust”, paper to be 
presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Session of Workshops, 
Granada, Spain, 2005, Workshop 6: Equality of Opportunity, p. 3. 
2 William MISHLER, Richard ROSE, ”What Are the Origins of Political Trust: Testing 
Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies”, Comparative Political Studies, 
vol. 34, no. 1, 2001, p. 30. 
3 Francis FUKUYAMA, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, Free 
Press, 1995, p. 26. 
4 Markus FREITAG, ”Social Capital in (Dis)similar Democracies. The Development of Gene-
ralized Trust in Japan and Switzerland”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 8, 2003, p. 944. 
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Consequently, cooperation may be undermined by any inherent lack of trust. 
Whereas trust could be seen as the basis of all solidarity, defined as the belief that 
all social groups share a common fate, and that is the responsibility of those having 
more resources to help those having fewer resources, trust may be weakened by 
sticky social characteristics, as social inequality. 
We are here interested in the relationship between inequality and trust, and by 
the consequences of this relationship. First, it has been stated that perennial or 
even growing inequality erodes the basis of trust in post-communist societies. 
There are findings that strongly support this claim. Gabriel Bădescu finds a quite 
strong relationship between the growing income inequality – measured as the dif-
ference between Gini indices from the ’80s and from the ’90s – and social trust – as 
measured by the European Values Survey1 in 1999 – for 14 post-communist states2. 
Second, the low level of social trust is accompanied by the wide spread belief 
that state institutions are largely incapable to fight corruption in these countries. 
Rose and Mishler find a strong effect of aggregate corruption on social trust. ”The 
more corrupt a country’s current institutions are, the more citizens in those coun-
tries are likely to distrust other people”3. But corruption also affects trust in public 
institutions. Using the Transparency International Index of corruption, the authors 
show how countries with higher aggregate corruption levels suffer the lowest lev-
els of aggregate trust in institutions. Additionally, low levels of trust in public in-
stitutions may undermine a much required support for these very institutions, 
which are supposed to promote social policies in order to reduce inequality: 
”Persistent petty corruption may make gift payments appear to be rational 
responses to an unresponsive service sector: You may feel more secure in 
knowing that you can buy your children’s way into a good school and to good 
grades, rather than risking more neutral assignment and grading criteria. You 
may well prefer to make an extra payment at a doctor’s office rather than wait 
your turn. Corruption feeds upon economic inequality, low trust, and poor 
government performance. But it generates alternative ways of coping that may 
inhibit the adoption of programs that might alleviate inequality”4. 
Whereas trust is essential for the support for public policies, trust also 
strengthens the belief that other members in society do not cheat the system, 
thereby consolidating solidarity. In societies affected by mistrust and inequality, 
social groups view one another as enemies. The poor consider that those who 
made fortunes during the transition time employed illegal means, especially cor-
ruption, while the rich oppose supporting larger burdens favoring the poor, which 
they classify as ”social parasites”. This phenomenon is clearly revealed by redistri-
bution claims in Romania. The conclusion for the Romanian survey5 is that: 
“[the] results suggest that people are aware of the high level of inequality 
and would like to live in a less stratified society, but with one important 
                                                    
1 See for instance Ton VAN SCHAIK, ”Social Capital in the European Values Study 
Surveys”, country paper prepared for the OECD-ONS International Conference on Social Capital 
Measurement, London, 2002. 
2 Gabriel BĂDESCU, ”Încredere şi democraţie în ţările în tranziţie”, Sociologie Românească, 
nr. 1-2, 2003, p. 116. 
3 William MISHLER, Richard ROSE, ”What Are the Origins of Political Trust:...cit.”, p. 53. 
4 Bo ROTHSTEIN, Eric M. USLANER, ”All for All:...cit.”, p. 25. 
5 See all the results of Romanian Public Opinion Barometers at www.osf.ro/bop.html. 
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qualification: homogenization should affect mainly the richest people, and in 
the same time, the mechanisms for differentiation based on merit should be 
preserved or enhanced”1. 
The perennial inequality and distrust may generate a vicious cycle, what is 
known as a ”social trap”: 
”Poor and inegalitarian countries thus find themselves entrapped into 
continuing inequality, mistrust and dysfunctional institutions. High levels of 
inequality contribute to lower levels of trust, which lessen the political and 
societal support for the state to collect resources for launching and imple-
menting universal welfare programs in an uncorrupted and non-discrimina-
tory way. Unequal societies find themselves trapped in a continuous cycle of 
inequality, low trust in others and in government, policies that do little to re-
duce the gap between the rich and the poor and create a sense of equal opportu-
nity. Demands for radical redistribution, as we see in many of the transition 
countries, exacerbate social tensions rather than relieving them”2. 
An example of a properly working social system comes from Sweden3. Both 
political right and left criticize the encompassing social system for its supposed 
disastrous effect on natural solidarity in this Scandinavian country. According to 
Rothstein, the argument is that people stop caring when social problems and altru-
ism are taken over by the government; compassion will be shown only through 
paying taxes and informal social networks will be weakened. In fact, the welfare 
state would undermine natural forms of solidarity, would undermine all intimate 
ties between citizens and, thus, would undermine even its own very moral basis. 
But there is hardly any empirical evidence to support such claims. Social capital 
has remained fairly stable over the last decades, and there is no evidence that the 
encompassing Swedish welfare state has undermined trust and social capital. One 
explanation seems to be in the way the welfare state system has been institutional-
ized, that is, the social policy based on the idea of ”people’s insurance” that sup-
plies all citizens with basic resources. First of all, the universal nature of this insur-
ance would prevent stigmatization of the poverty relief, so that people receiving 
support from the state social system cannot be seen as ”the others”, ”the social 
parasites” or ”the unworthy”. Second, if one compares means-tested programs to 
universal programs, the latter are far less likely to create the suspicion that people 
are cheating the system4. 
We believe that in transition countries inequality not only affects trust be-
tween fellow citizens and social solidarity, but also that inequality has effects on 
the way people accept social diversity and practice tolerance. It may be that social 
competition and lack of tolerance dispose people to trust their in-group and to dis-
trust other groups. We have already looked at how social capital may be responsi-
ble for tolerance and cooperation in multicultural communities in Transylvania5, 
                                                    
1 Gabriel BĂDESCU, ”Culture, Income Tax and Social Inequality in Romania”, Romanian 
Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 4, no. 1, 2004, p. 85. 
2 Bo ROTHSTEIN, Eric M. USLANER, ”All for All:…cit.”, pp. 24-25. 
3 Bo ROTHSTEIN, ”Social Capital in the Social Democratic Welfare State”, Politics & Society, 
vol. 29, no. 2, 2001, pp. 207-241. 
4 Ibidem, p. 234. 
5 Dragoş DRAGOMAN, ”Capital social şi relaţii etnice. Toleranţă, încredere şi cooperare în 
comunităţi multietnice”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (edit.), 
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but we intend here to assess the importance of inequality for trust and social toler-
ance. The strong belief in perennial inequality in Romania may inhibit social trust, 
which may in turn promote ethnic and social intolerance. We thereby use a Roma-
nian survey on ”Intolerance, Discrimination, and Authoritarianism in the Public 
Opinion”, conducted in 2003 by Gallup Romania on the request of the Institute for 
Public Policy Romania. 
Inequality, Social Inequity, and Frustration 
We may consider different types of inequality: economic inequality, income 
inequality, social inequality, but we emphasize here another type of inequality, 
inequality of opportunity. Whereas economic inequality may be produced by the 
capitalist economy, inequality of opportunity could be seen as an inequality affect-
ing the citizens’ social trust, as well as their trust in state institutions. There are two 
levels of this perceived inequality. First, there is the feeling that those who made a 
fortune during transition time, who managed to acquire an education or a power 
status – ”the social winners” – became, in fact, more arrogant. All they need is a 
handful of money, a higher-education certificate or an average public function to 
start despising fellow citizens. Whereas the former socialist society was quite egali-
tarian, the current effort to become differentiated may cause distress. In fact, there 
is a strong belief in the arrogance one may display. 
 
Table 1  
The Belief in the Arrogance of the Transition’s ”Social Winners” 
Item Agree (%) 
Generally speaking, people who aquire university 
education despise other people 
57.3 
Generally speaking, rich people despise other people 82.7 
Generally speaking, people who aquire a bit of power  
start to despise other people 
84.4 
 
Second, there is an inequality in transition societies that may be seen as pure 
inequity. Dysfunctional laws and state institutions, widespread corruption, and 
impunity for many officeholders may nurture opinion that crimes remain largely 
unpunished and rules are systematically broken by those in power. They may also 
strengthen the belief that one can make a fortune only in such a way, by using per-
verted means such as corruption. Therefore all solidarity is useless, because it ap-
pears contrary to the ”winning strategy” in society. 
                                                    
Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnic din România, 
Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj, 2005, pp. 139-154. 
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Table 2 
The Belief in Social Inequity 
Item Agree (%) 
Laws are useless, since those in power act as they wish 80.1 
Nowadays, most of those who break the rules remain unpunished 75.9 
Nowadays, even tribunals fail to do justice to ordinary people 69.0 
The only way to make fortune in Romania is by illegal means 66.7 
The only reason for parties is that politicians could make a career 68.5 
 
This perceived inequity is largely favored by pervasive corruption. As stated 
above, only those people who make a fortune break the rules, in conjunction with 
people in power. This belief in widespread corruption and outrageous inequity 
erodes interpersonal as well as political trust: 
”Trust is closely related to corruption. The level of corruption is most 
likely to affect the level of ‘positive’ trust. If somebody commits an illegal act 
against you, e.g. ignoring the formal rules of a contract, then the offender will 
be punished in a police and court system without corruption. It is not possible 
for the offender to use the gains from the crime and split it with the police and 
the judge. So, if both parties know that it does not pay to break the rules, they 
will adapt their behavior and, by repeated encounters, build up trust and trust 
[…] When citizens cannot trust institutions in society and when everyone is 
not equal to the law, this unpredictability blocks the building of trust”1. 
Whereas democracy badly needs legitimacy in order to gain respect for rules, 
the lack of trust in state institutions and social distrust stimulate dishonest behavior 
in public life. Corruption undermines economic growth, affects state legitimacy, so-
cial trust and solidarity, in a continuous vicious cycle that is very hard to break: 
”We find that people who perceive increasing income inequality are less 
likely to approve of government performance and to trust other people and 
are more likely to support limits on incomes of the rich. More generally, 
when people see the government as corrupt and the country moving in the 
wrong direction, social solidarity (trust in other people) and confidence in the 
state will decline – and there will be increasing demands for curtailing mar-
ket forces and placing limits on incomes. Most notably, people are largely in-
ured to the petty corruption of everyday life; it is larger scale corruption – by 
business people and especially government officials – that threatens social 
solidarity and support for the state”2. 
                                                    
1 Gert TINGGAARD SVENDSEN, ”Social Capital, Corruption and Economic Growth: 
Eastern and Western Europe”, working paper 03-21, Departement of Economics, Aarhus 
School of Business, p. 8. 
2 Eric M. USLANER, Gabriel BĂDESCU, ”Making the Grade in Transition: Equality, 
Tranparency, Trust, and Fairness”, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political 
Research Joint Session of Workshops, Granada, Spain, 2005, p. 4. 
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Economists have already stressed that trust may affect economic growth1. 
Trust, in turn, may be largely impossible in a society affected by poverty and sav-
age competition. In fact, transitions to capitalism and economic transformations 
that have occurred in the region have provoked a fall in revenues and in the satis-
faction with one’s life. Furthermore, the persistent dysfunctional economy only 
produces people more pessimistic toward future amelioration. 
 
Table 3  
The Current Satisfaction with One’s Life and the  
Expected Situation in Five Years Time 
Item Worse (%) 
How your current life is when compared with that five years ago? 51.0 
How do you think people in Romania live, compared with the 
situation existing five years ago? 67.7 
How do you think you will live in five years time? 26.8 
How do you think people in Romania live in five years time? 29.5 
 
Dissatisfaction, pessimism regarding the future, combined with the strong be-
lief in the existing inequalities and social inequities may cause deep frustration. In 
order to measure this phenomenon, we first build scales on each dimension we 
have previously indicated, that is, the perceived arrogance of the ”social winners”, 
social inequity and pessimism for the near future, by adding up composing 
items. We see how perceived arrogance and inequity, for example, are correlated 
(r = .363, p < .01, N = 1500). We then combine the three dimensions in a single so-
cial frustration index and look at how it may stimulate authoritarian attitudes and 
ethnic prejudices, affect trust, and ethnic and social tolerance. 
Frustration and Authoritarianism 
We begin with a discussion on authoritarian attitudes. Although we have al-
ready indicated the link between ethnic intolerance and authoritarianism in Tran-
sylvania2, we here intend to focus on the relationship between social frustration 
and authoritarian attitudes. Dumitru Sandu demonstrates how status inconsis-
tency, that is, differences between economic status and education status, strongly 
affect public action attitudes in Romania3. Thus negative inconsistency (lower 
                                                    
1 Martin PALDAM, Gert TINGAART SVENDSEN, ”Missing Social Capital and the 
Transition in Eastern Europe”, Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition, no. 5, 
2001, pp. 21-34. 
2 Dragoş DRAGOMAN, ”La recomposition du champ politique régional en Roumanie. Le 
succès du Forum Allemand à Sibiu/Hermannstadt”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science 
Review, vol. V, no. 1, 2005, p. 185. 
3 Dumitru SANDU, ”Status Inconsistency as Predictor of Public Action Attitudes in Romania”, 
Current Sociology, vol. 52, no. 6, 2004, pp. 989-1020. 
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economic status than education status) probably correlates more with authoritar-
ian attitudes1. In Romania the poverty rate sharply increased from 1996 to 2000, 
reaching 30% in 20012. Consequently, there is a strong belief of downward mobil-
ity, large numbers of citizens considering that their current life is worse that be-
fore 1989. Since changes in educational status are slower than in economic status, 
we can expect an increase in authoritarian attitudes. We measure tendency to-
wards authoritarian attitudes using a score of authoritarianism, computed on the 
basis of several items, as shown below. Unsurprisingly, the score turns out to be 
positively correlated with social frustration, though the correlation is weak 
(r = .104, p < .01, N = 1470). 
 
Table 4 
Authoritarian Attitudes 
Item Agree (%) 
This is the man who always decides for his family 39.3 
Sometimes children must be punished and beaten in order to learn 
how to conduct themselves well 19.1 
Books an ideas that undermine state authority must be forbidden 35.5 
The most important things children must learn are respecting and 
obeying authorities 53.7 
Romania needs a strong leader, who imposes order 73.8 
Social Trust and Institutional Trust in Romania 
The first observation is that social trust in Central and Eastern Europe is 
weaker than in Western Europe. Whereas the mean for the Western European 
countries reaches 36%, the mean for the post-communist countries is only 20.6%3. 
This difference may be caused by what people currently understand by ”most 
people can be trusted”. Gabriel Bădescu states that a better way to operationalize 
trust would be confidence in other ethnicities4. Public Opinion Barometer sur-
veys in Romania constantly use the same question, while registering sharp varia-
tions in the level of social trust5. 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, p. 1007. 
2 Ibidem, p. 991. 
3 Gabriel BĂDESCU, ”Încredere şi democraţie…cit.”, p. 113. 
4 IDEM, ”Social Trust and Democratization in the Post-Communist Societies”, in Gabriel 
BĂDESCU, Eric USLANER (eds.), Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy, Routledge, New 
York, 2003. 
5 The Public Opinion Barometer (POB) is financed by Open Society Foundation Romania. 
The complete data is available at http://www.osf.ro/ro/bop/cercetare.html. 
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Table 5 
Most People Can Be Trusted 
Survey Institute % 
June CURS 12.4 
1998 
November MMT 10.8 
May MMT 37.5 
1999 
October CURS 27.8 
May MMT 29.2 
2000 
November CURS 30.7 
May MMT 31.3 
2001 
November CURS 28.7 
June IMAS 38.0 
2002 
October MMT 32.5 
May Gallup 34.1 
2003 
October CURS 31.0 
May Gallup 38.7 
2004 
October Gallup 31.7 
2005 May Gallup 40.0 
 
As stated above, trust may be related to many social, political and economic val-
ues. Recent research demonstrates how social trust endorses economic cooperation, 
reducing transactions’ costs and inhibiting corruption, promoting economic growth1. 
When it comes to political values, there are vast amounts of literature linking social 
capital to political interest, political competence and participation, to the ideal type of 
a ”good citizen”2. There are, however, many other values connected to social capital. 
Rothstein and Uslaner indicate satisfaction and optimism for the future as two im-
portant values3. Inspecting these variables in our research sample, we find how they 
are correlated to social trust. More people consider current individual and collective 
life worse than that experienced five years ago, and they trust other people less 
(r = -.192, p < .01, N = 1380). Moreover, the stronger their pessimism for individual 
and collective life in five years time, the less trusting are individuals in Romania 
(r = -.101, p < .01, N = 1380). As one can expect, dissatisfaction with current life is 
significantly correlated with pessimism (r = .307, p < .01, N = 1500). 
Turning to institutional trust, we notice the same pattern for social trust, that is 
the lack of trust in state institutions all over Central and Eastern Europe4. But we 
                                                    
1 Christian BJØRNSKOV, ”Corruption and Social Capital – Is There a Causal Link?”, paper 
presented at the European Public Choice Society meeting in Aarhus, Denmark, April 2003. 
2 William WALTERS, ”Social Capital and Political Sociology: Re-imagining Politics?”, 
Sociology, vol. 36, no. 2, 2002, pp. 377-397. 
3 Bo ROTHSTEIN, Eric M. USLANER, ”All for All:…cit.”, p. 24. 
4 Ioan MĂRGINEAN, Iuliana PRECUPEŢU, Marius PRECUPEŢU, ”România în cadrul celui 
de-al treilea val al democratizării”, Sociologie Românească, nr. 1-4, 2001, p. 26. 
Equality, Trust and Tolerance 457 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VI • no. 2 • 2006 
have to stress here that distrust in political institutions is a common feature in West-
ern Europe as well1. In Romania, the less trusted institutions are those that have been 
designed to represent people’s interests, such as Parliament and political parties. 
 
Table 6 
Institutional Trust 
Item Trust (%) 
Churches 77.3 
Military 62.8 
Mass-media 53.2 
Municipality mayor 35.5 
Police 34.3 
Presidency 31.5 
Romanian Secret Service 26.3 
Government 22.8 
Law courts 22.0 
Banks 20.7 
Parliament 15.8 
Labor unions 13.6 
Political parties  9.3 
 
There is a strong debate regarding the relationship between the two types of 
trust, namely between social or interpersonal and political or institutional trust. 
According to Putnam, interpersonal trust helps make political institutions work 
because it ”spills over,” it ”spills up” from individuals to institutions2. But other 
scholars are skeptical about this relationship. Not only do the two dimensions not 
correlate strongly, but they are theoretically different3. Newton states that social 
and political trust tends to be expressed by different kinds of people for different 
reasons. Even if there is generally a positive association between social trust and 
political confidence, the relationship is not particularly tight or close. Mishler and 
Rose find no evidence supporting the theory claiming that there is a close connec-
tion between social and political trust4. From their evidence it is clear that interper-
sonal trust does not spill up to create institutional trust, and institutional trust does 
not trickle down. Interpersonal trust appears almost wholly exogenous to the po-
litical process. It is more an individual personality trait whose origins lie outside 
the scope of politics. By contrast, the authors stress that institutional trust is sub-
stantially affected by both political and economic performance while being almost 
                                                    
1 Mattei DOGAN, ”Deficit of Confidence within European Democracies”, in M. HALLER 
(ed.), The Making of the European Union, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 241-264. See also IDEM, 
”Trust-mistrust in European democracies”, Sociologie Românească, nr. 1-4, 2001, pp. 1-20. 
2 Robert PUTNAM, ”Turning In, Turning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital 
in America”, PS: Political Science and Politics, 28, 1995, pp. 664-683. 
3 Kenneth NEWTON, ”Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society and Democracy”, International 
Political Science Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2001, p. 204. 
4 William MISHLER, Richard ROSE, ”What Are the Origins of Political Trust:…cit.”, p. 55. 
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wholly unaffected by interpersonal trust or by socialization influences. There are, 
however, findings supporting the claim that social trust and political trust are con-
nected. Among the decisive determinants of generalized trust in Japan and Swit-
zerland, for example, the strongest effect relates to the influence of institutional 
confidence1. Following a principal components analysis (not shown here), we de-
cided to group confidence in Romanian Parliament, Government, Presidency, as 
well as in municipality mayors, police, law courts and political parties into a single 
dimension of institutional trust. Social trust appears connected to the institutional 
trust, but the correlation is rather weak (r = .101, p < .01, N = 1380). 
What we look for is how social trust affects social tolerance in Romania. We 
have already found out how social trust is connected to the predisposition to en-
gage oneself in daily contacts with people that are ethnically different2. We add 
here the effects of social frustration on social and ethnic tolerance. Intolerance to-
ward different people may be caused by social frustration which is a reaction to 
successive failures in social upward mobility. Frustration indeed negatively corre-
lates with social trust (r = -.125, p < .01, N = 1380) and political confidence 
(r = -.169, p < .01, N = 1380). We explore below the connection between social 
frustration, on the one hand, and ethnic, religious and social toleration on the 
other hand. Because we intend to examine ethnic tolerance in Romania, we 
exclude from our sample all ethnic minorities and focus narrowly on ethnic 
Romanians (N = 1384). 
Social Intolerance 
Social intolerance can vary from the extreme intolerance, defined as the ten-
dency to destroy people who are different from oneself, to the tendency to support 
people who conduct themselves in a different manner, in spite of all disagreement, 
which we term the highest tolerance, associated with generosity3. Between the two 
extremes, there is a range of possible attitudes. The most common is that based 
upon relativism, acknowledging that two people may have different faiths, but 
they are both entitled to have a faith. While tolerance is connected to specific atti-
tudes toward social differences, we may examine tolerance’s relationships with 
trust, since in modern societies, prejudices and discrimination are more and more 
disguised. 
Social distance is measured here by the tendency to engage in various close re-
lationships, such as with family members, friends, colleagues, neighbors, or fellow 
citizens that are different. The difference may be a religious one (as with Jehovah’s 
Witnesses or with Muslims), it may concern a sexual orientation (as with gays and 
lesbians) or it may imply a different citizenship (as with citizens of Moldova). Us-
ing these specific social distances we compute a score of social intolerance, where 
high values indicate large social distances. The regression analysis demonstrates 
                                                    
1 Markus FREITAG, ”Social Capital in (Dis)similar Democracies…cit.”, pp. 936-966. 
2 Dragoş DRAGOMAN, ”Capital social şi relaţii etnice. Toleranţă, încredere şi cooperare în 
comunităţi multietnice”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (ed.), Barometrul 
Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002...cit., pp. 139-154. 
3 Dumitru SANDU, ”Diferenţieri europene ale toleranţei sociale”, Sociologie Românească, 
nr. 1-2, 2002, p. 2. 
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that social intolerance is explained less by trust and more by frustration and au-
thoritarianism. Two variables that may inhibit social intolerance are education and 
the urban residence. Living in Transylvania also makes people less intolerant. One 
explanation may reside in the religious and ethnic heterogeneity of the province, as 
the frequent contacts between different people may stimulate tolerance. 
 
Table 7  
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Social Intolerance 
Gender: masculine (1) -.047 -.061* -.058* -0.050 -.069* 
Age (continuous) .006 .022 -.007 -0.002 -.001 
Education (0-9) -.134*** -.136*** -.118*** -0.120*** -.109** 
Unemployed (1) .006 --- 0.007 -0.001 -.003 
Personal income (continuous) -.025 -.032 -.014 -0.022 -.019 
Residence: town (1) -.130*** -.139*** -.118*** -0.140*** -.133*** 
Region: Transylvania (1) -.073** -.083** -.174** -0.070* -.083** 
Social trust  -.028   -.019 
Authoritarianism   .123***  .109*** 
Frustration    0.099*** .081** 
Adjusted R square .058 .067 .071 .067 .084 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; standardized coefficients beta shown only. 
Ethnic and Religious Intolerance 
There is in Romania a tendency to exclude people that are ethnically and relig-
iously different from society. This intolerance may be expressed by the refusal to 
include these people in the (political) definition of the nation and the subsequent 
refusal of their rights. But there is another indicator of intolerance, the anxiety re-
garding the ethnic purity of the nation and the expressed consent to a hypothetical 
expelling of people that are different. 
 
Table 8 
Ethnic and Religious Intolerance 
Item Agree (%) 
People that live in Romania and are not ethnically Romanians do not 
belong to the Romanian nation 
23.9 
People that live in Romania and do not belong to the Romanian 
Orthodox Church do not belong to the Romanian nation 
6.3 
Ethnic Romanians should not mix with other ethnicities 30.4 
People that are not ethnically Romanians should leave Romania 14.5 
Nowadays minorities in Romania benefit of too many rights 20.0 
460 DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VI • no. 2 • 2006 
While almost one third of Romanians consider that Romanians should not mix 
with other ethnicities, a proportion as large as 14.5 % think that other ethnicities 
should leave the country. Besides the scale of these proportions, we find out that 
these two variables correlates (r = .486, p < .01, N = 1235). Tolerance toward other 
ethnicities is still a problem in Romania, and it may be fueled by the lasting confu-
sion between the ethnic and the political definition of the nation1. Monica Robotin 
explores the consequences of this confusion for the way ethnic Romanians gener-
ally consider Hungarians and Gypsies in Romania2. Measuring the importance of a 
series of variables for intolerance we find out that social trust has no effect. Only 
authoritarianism and frustration, along with residence in towns and in Transylva-
nia, appear as predictors of ethnic and religious intolerance. 
 
Table 9 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Ethnic and Religious Intolerance 
Gender: masculine (1) -.039 -.041 -.054 -.043 -.052 
Age (continuous) -.006 .004 -.018 -.016 -.020 
Education (0-9) -.107** -.096* -.088** -.086** -.063 
Unemployed (1) .042 .040 .051 .034 .039 
Personal income (continuous) .010 -.028 .019 .014 -.016 
Residence: town (1) -.075* -.082** -.071* -.088** -.086** 
Region: Transylvania (1) -.089** -.104*** -.091** -.082** -.102*** 
Social trust  .001   .019 
Authoritarianism   .170***  .141*** 
Frustration    .152*** .136*** 
Adjusted R square .028 .036 .060 .050 .078 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; standardized coefficients beta shown only. 
Prejudices and Intolerance  
toward Ethnic Hungarians 
Intolerance in Romania is not only toward other ethnicities and religions, con-
sidered as annoying differences, but toward specific ethnicities. As we will stress 
below, widespread prejudices strongly affect tolerance toward these ethnic minori-
ties. Although we have already examined the intolerance against ethnic Hungari-
                                                    
1 Romanian Constitution in 1991 states that ”Romania is a national state” – article 1; 
”National sovereignty belongs to the Romanian people”– article 2; ”The unity of the Romanian 
people is the foundation of the state” – article 4. The confusion is due to the fact that in Romanian 
the term ”people” has a primary ethnic meaning. 
2 Monica ROBOTIN, ”Stat şi identitate etnică în România. O incursiune în percepţiile 
majorităţii şi minorităţilor asupra acestei relaţii”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica 
ROBOTIN (ed.), Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002. cit.., pp. 15-40. 
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ans in Romania1, we use an intolerance score in order to explore the relationships 
between frustration, social trust and tolerance. This specific score of intolerance 
against ethnic Hungarians is based on the following items. 
 
Table 10  
Intolerance toward Ethnic Hungarians 
Item Agree (%) 
Hungarians in Romania should speak only Romanian when 
dealing with public administration, although in some regions 
they outnumber ethnic Romanians 
71.3 
It would be better that ethnic Hungarians go live in Hungary 26.0 
Item Disagree (%) 
Romania must provide public education in Hungarian to ethnic 
Hungarian children 45.7 
Romania must afford a greater autonomy to the counties where 
ethnic Hungarians constitute a majority 78.7 
 
The current relationships between Hungarian and Romanian communities in 
Transylvania, between Hungarian and Romanian political parties, and between 
public authorities in Romania and in Hungary are dominated much more by coop-
eration and mutual respect than ten years ago. That period was dominated by a 
political and symbolic conflict, and the public discourse in Romania was filled with 
negative stereotypes regarding the Hungarian community in Transylvania and the 
Hungarian state. Though only a certain part of the stereotypes are negative2, they 
have been largely used by Romanian parties in different contexts and have been 
considerably amplified3. 
 
Table 11  
Prejudices against Ethnic Hungarians 
Item Agree (%) 
The ethnic Hungarians’ interests diverge from those of other 
Romanian citizens 
57.2 
Although they can, many Hungarians refuse to speak 
Romanian 
76.6 
Hungarians never abandon all hope to attach Transylvania 
to the Hungarian state 
57.0 
                                                    
1 Dragoş DRAGOMAN, ”La recomposition du champ politique régional en Roumanie…cit.”, 
pp. 181-201. 
2 Raluca SOREANU, ”Autodefinire şi heterodefinire a românilor şi maghiarilor din România. O 
analiză empirică a stereotipurilor etnice şi a fundamentelor diferite de definire a identităţii 
etnice”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (ed.), Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 
1994-2002...cit.., pp. 65-88. 
3 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Ruleta. Români şi maghiari: 1990-2000, Polirom, Iaşi, 2001. 
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Intolerance toward ethnic Hungarians largely correlates with the preju-
dices against them (r = .468, p < .01, N = 1384), but it correlates also with frustra-
tion. As indicated in the regression analysis below, frustration is a predictor 
largely weaker than the level of prejudices, but no other variable has any sig-
nificant effect on tolerance when these two variables are entered in the regres-
sion model. 
 
Table 12 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Ethnic Intolerance  
against Ethnic Hungarians 
Gender: masculine (1) .027 .006 .022 .023 -.017 -.024 
Age (continuous) -.087** -.076* -.082* -.096** -.050 -.052 
Education (0-9) .003 .007 .010 .025 .005 .019 
Unemployed (1) -.034 -.027 -.024 -.043 -.041 -.042 
Personal income  
(continuous) 
.017 .020 .019 .021 .039 .035 
Residence: town (1) .061* .049* .043 .047 -.025 -.032 
Region: Transylvania (1) -.081** -.088** -.092** -.074* -.030 -.049 
Social trust  -.042    -.018 
Authoritarianism   .097**   .047 
Frustration    .158***  .087** 
Prejudices     .468*** .389*** 
Adjusted R square .016 .013 .019 .040 .223 .177 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; standardized coefficients beta shown only. 
Intolerance toward Gypsies 
Intolerance toward Gypsies in Romania is not only an ethnic problem, but a 
social phenomenon as well. Socially excluded and largely discriminated, they 
have also been involved in major ethnic conflicts, as those in Hădăreni, Bolintin, 
and Mihail Kogălniceanu1. In spite of a public strategy to alleviate their hard so-
cial situation – that has not shown as of yet any positive effect – Gypsies still re-
main marginalized2. 
                                                    
1 Veronika Leila SZENTE, ”Furie în zori. Violenţa împotriva rromilor în România”, Centrul 
European pentru Drepturile Rromilor, seria rapoartelor pe ţări, nr. 2, septembrie 1996. Also see 
Dimitrina PETROVA, ”Stare de impunitate: încălcarea drepturilor omului – cazul romilor din 
România”, Centrul European pentru Drepturile Rromilor, seria rapoartelor pe ţări, nr. 10, 
septembrie 2001. 
2 Marian CHIRIAC, ”O necesară schimbare de strategie. Raport privind stadiul de aplicare a 
Strategiei guvernamentele de îmbunătăţire a situaţiei romilor din România”, in IDEM, Provocările 
diversităţii. Politici publice privind minorităţile naţionale şi religioase din România, Ethnocultural 
Diversity Resource Center, Cluj, 2005, pp. 33-58. 
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Table 13 
Intolerance against Gypsies 
Item Agree (%) 
Because they can not integrate, authorities should force Gypsies to live 
to the outer edge of society 36.2 
Places like restaurants and stores should exist where access of Gypsies 
should be forbidden 32.3 
The residents in villages and towns in Romania should have to choose 
whether Gypsies may settle in their district 47.2 
The state should intervene in order to stop the growing in number of 
Gypsy communities 48.3 
Authorities should stop Gypsies from travelling abroad, because they 
only make us be a scorn to other people 67.6 
Item Disagree (%) 
The state should provide more assistance and subsidies to the Gypsies 53.6 
It is good that special places exist for Gypsies in public schools and state 
universities 26.0 
 
As we see in the table above, the expressed consent to some vexing and dis-
criminating actions is a worry. Ethnic Romanians wish that authorities deprive 
Gypsies of a legitimate right – the free movement right – even though they have al-
ready experienced a similar limitation of the same right. Romanian citizens no 
longer need visas in order to travel across Europe, as stated by the Schengen agree-
ment, but they clearly discriminate against Gypsies, which they consider culpable 
for the poor image of Romania abroad. Moreover they largely support social segre-
gation and active discrimination measures, and reject affirmative action and the 
state support which favors Gypsies. Thus the appropriate regime for these respon-
dents would not be a fully consolidated democracy, based on the principles of uni-
versal human rights and social equality, but rather an apartheid regime, founded 
on racial segregation and political and economical discrimination. 
 
Table 14   
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Intolerance against Gypsies 
Gender: masculine (1) -.017 -.026 -.027 -.021 -.037 
Age (continuous) .022 .023 .022 .009 .011 
Education (0-9) -.081* -.084* -.068* -.053 -.054 
Unemployed (1) .053 .044 .063* .042 .038 
Personal income (continuous) -.006 -.003 -.001 -.002 .006 
Residence: town (1) -.008 -.024 -.008 -.025 -.038 
Region: Transylvania (1) .050 .029 .061* .059* .044 
Social trust  -.070*   -.047 
Authoritarianism   .060*  .037 
Frustration    .201*** .171*** 
Adjusted R square .009 .014 .014 .048 .044 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; standardized coefficients beta shown only. 
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The regression models presented above indicate a weak significant effect 
of social trust on specific tolerance toward Gypsies. That is the same for edu-
cation. The most important factor is again frustration. It means that frustration 
not only undermines social trust, but also feeds the public consent to some ex-
treme measures of racial discrimination and segregation. The result is a warning 
which stems from the lack of importance of another factor, education. The level 
of education does not have the importance one would ordinarily expect it to 
have. When viewing the poor performance of public strategies to improve Gyp-
sies’ social condition, we only expect that discrimination and social exclusion 
will persist. 
Intolerance and Prejudices against Jews 
The public debate on the responsibilities that Romania has for the Holocaust is 
a novelty for Romanian society. Before this, the debate was confined to the individ-
ual responsibilities that some well-known intellectuals – Cioran, Eliade şi Noica – 
had for the public discrimination of Jews in fascist Romania1. While there is a pub-
lic sensibility in discussing such topics, intolerance against Jews can still be per-
ceived. This intolerance is rather symbolic – based on ethnic and religious preju-
dices, since Jews living in Romania in 2002 were only 5870 people, 0.027 % of the 
entire Romanian population. 
 
Table 15  
Intolerance against Jews 
Item Agree (%) 
Jewish emigration should be encouraged 18.3 
Jews’ influence in our country is much too large 13.7 
Authentic Christians should not interact with Jews 13.1 
 
Negative stereotypes affect the way Romanians evaluate Jews. Whereas a 
number of stereotypes are anti-Judaic – regarding the collective fault of Jews for 
the Crucifixion of Jesus and the divine punishment God inflicted on them, there 
are also anti-Semitic prejudices – old and new – regarding the Jewish conspiracy to 
rule world politics and economy or their odd contribution in imposing commu-
nism in Romania. 
                                                    
1 Alexandra LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, Filozofie şi naţionalism. Paradoxul Noica, trad. roum. 
E. Marcu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998. See also Florin ŢURCANU, Mircea Eliade – Prizonierul 
istoriei, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006. 
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Table 16 
Prejudices against Jews 
Item Agree (%) 
Jews destabilize societies where they live 10.8 
Jews overemphasize the persecution they were exposed to in order 
to claim advantages 
28.5 
Jews’ interests in Romania diverge from those of other Romanian 
citizens 
24.1 
World politics and finance are under Jewish control 23.5 
Jews upheld communist rule in Romania 15.4 
Jews can not be forgiven for such sin that the Crucifixion of Jesus 30.3 
Jews’ suffering is a divine punishment 37.3 
 
Regression models above show that some demographic variables are predic-
tors of intolerance against Jews in Romania. Whereas young people are slightly 
more intolerant, educated people living in towns are more tolerant toward Jews; 
even if the correlations are not so strong. Frustration and authoritarianism are 
more important predictors, but the greatest influence comes from prejudices 
against Jews. We have already noticed the importance of prejudices for the intoler-
ance against Hungarians. 
 
Table 17 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Intolerance against Jews 
Gender: masculine (1) -.026 -.019 -.043 -.028 -.067* -.060* 
Age (continuous) -.028 -.037 -.040 -.033 -.091*** -.109*** 
Education (0-9) -.062 -.067 -.039 -.052 -.089** -.073* 
Unemployed (1) .005 -.003 .011 .002 -.025 -.034 
Personal income (continuous) .009 .003 .023 .011 .010 .009 
Residence: town (1) -.063* -.061 -.059 -.070* -.055* -.046 
Region: Transylvania (1) -.048 -.029 -.051 -.044 .005 .011 
Social trust  -.021    .008 
Authoritarianism   .176***   .083** 
Frustration    .075**  .047 
Prejudices     .543*** .503*** 
Adjusted R square .007 .006 .038 .012 .295 .279 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; standardized coefficients beta shown only. 
Conclusion 
We have already estimated various types of intolerance. We have shown that 
in Romania there still exists, at a public level, a social intolerance, an ethnic and 
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religious intolerance, as well as particular types of ethnic intolerance against ethnic 
Hungarians, Gypsies and Jews living in Romania. The question is whether these 
specific types of intolerance – social, religious, ethnic, and racial – do form a single 
dimension or they are different phenomena. Well-known studies already stressed 
not only that different types of intolerance are correlated, but also they have shown 
also that intolerance is related to authoritarian traits of personality1. A principal 
components analysis (not shown here) demonstrates that in our case, authoritari-
anism and the various types of intolerance form a single, distinct factor. All the 
variables have loadings greater then 0.50, except the authoritarianism and the in-
tolerance against ethnic Hungarians, which are still substantial (0.47). The greatest 
loading is that of the ethnic and religious intolerance (0.66). 
The explanation for this noticeable intolerance appears to no only be authori-
tarianism, but also frustration. It is accountable in some extent for the general so-
cial, ethnic and religious intolerance, as well as for the specific intolerance against 
ethnic Hungarians and especially against Gypsies living in Romania. Frustration is 
expressed by people’s discontent with the current inequity they perceive in every 
day life and by the dissatisfaction regarding their own life. Whereas frustration un-
dermines social trust, it affects the tolerance toward people that are different in 
various respects. 
The difficulty in counterpoising frustration is that factors initially estimated as 
highly important, that is education or residence in towns, appear as less favorable. 
Their overall effect is scant when compared not only with frustration, but also with 
authoritarianism or specific prejudices against other ethnicities. Consequently, we 
have to rely upon state institutions for this effort in fighting inequalities. The major 
problem is that citizens do not trust state institutions, as they have proved to be in-
capable in fighting corruption, for example. And many really estimate that one 
source of inequity is the way some people made a fortune by breaking the rules, in 
connivance with people in power. Whereas corruption may undermine economic 
growth, the belief in pervasive corruption erodes social and political trust. There-
fore, political and social distrust undermine state legitimacy and social solidarity, 
fuel social and ethnic intolerance, in a continuous vicious cycle that is still very 
hard to break in Romania. 
 
                                                    
1 Theodore W. ADORNO et al., The Authoritarian Personality, Harper, New York, 1950. 
